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When the Bush administration assumed office in 1989 the United States development
assistance program was in disarray.  The bilateral development assistance component of the
assistance budget had declined from $3.5 billion (in  1989 dollars) in the last Carter  budget
to $2.8 billion in the last Reagan  budget - a decline  of 20 percent.  The supporting
(ie. security) assistance component which had experienced rapid growth in the first Reagan
administration declined continuously during the second Reagan administration.  During the
winter of 1991 both the administration and the Congress developed plans to review the U.S.
assistance effort.  In this paper I attempt to chart several alternative  scenarios for the future
of U.S. foreign economic assistance.  Before doing so, however, it will be useful to first step
back and review the forces that have  shaped U.S. assistance policy in the past.
-I-
U.S.  development  assistance  policy,  following  the  post  World  War  II  relief  and
recovery  efforts  in Western Europe  and  East  Asia,  has  been guided  by a series  of four
successive  strategic visions:1
The first was  outlined as the fourth point in President Harry S. Truman's inaugural
address  of January  20,  1949.  In that  speech,  Truman proposed  "a bold  new program  for
making  the  benefits  of  scientific  advances  and  industrial  progress  available  for  the
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas."  This was the technical assistance vision.2
The  second  was  the  vision  articulated  by  John  F.  Kennedy  in  his  presidential
campaign and in his first years in office that "a more prosperous world would also be a more
secure world."  This articulation held out the promise of refocusing the security concerns of
the Eisenhower administration from containment to development.  The assistance policy that
emerged  emphasized  the  transfer  of  large  financial  resources  by  both  bilateral  and
multilateral institutions.
The  third  was  the  vision  articulated  by  members  of the  House  Foreign  Affairs
Committee in the late  1960s and early  1970s - a "New Direction" in foreign assistance  that
would  focus  on basic  human  rights  and  human  needs.  Aid  should  be  directed  to  the
political  empowerment  and  the  improvement  of the  economic  well  being of the poorest
people in the poorest countries.
The fourth was closer linkage of economic  and security assistance  and the doctrine
of  "privatization" emphasized  in  the  rhetoric  of  the  early  Reagan  administration.  The
privatization  issue was  not  a  new  theme  in U.S.  development  assistance  policy.  It was
foreshadowed  by  the  "trade-not-aid" rhetoric  of the  early  Eisenhower  administration.2
Translation  of the Reagan administration  rhetoric into policy was  confronted  by an AID
administration whose emotional commitments were closer to the New Direction themes than
to the agenda of the right wing of his own administration.  In addition, the leadership of the
AID  Private  Enterprise  Bureau  was  inept  in  its  efforts  to  link  doctrine  to  policy  and
program.  The Bush  administration,  with its focus  on "democratization  and privatizatiori"
appears  to be more effective  in pursuing the Reagan agenda.3
Throughout the four decades between the late  1940s and the late  1980s,  there have
been two  overarching  constraints on the pursuit  of the four visions  or strategies.
The  first  is  that  United  States  development  assistance  policy  has  largely  been
derivative  of cold war containment  strategy.  The growth  and decline  in the magnitude  of
assistance  flows  have  been  dominated  by  the  intensity  of the  cold  war.  The  decline  in
support for economic assistance  since the mid-1980s  is only the most recent  manifestation
of this relationship.  When the  effectiveness  in the use  of aid resources  for development
purposes  has  appeared  to  be  in  conflict  with  short  run  strategic  objectives  the  strategic
objectives have generally dominated  assistance policy.  As the intensity  of the cold war has
declined  domestic  ethnic  politics  have  played  an  increasingly  important  role  in  the
geographic  flow of assistance  resources.
The  second  is  the continuing  gap  between the  articulated  objectives  of assistance
policy and the limited resources  that have been made available  to realize  these objectives.
The  commitment  to  global poverty  reduction  in the  1970s  and  debt  restructuring  in the
1980s are among the more recent examples of the gap between rhetoric and resources.  In
fiscal  1990  budget  authority  for  U.S.  bilateral  economic  assistance,  including  both
development  and strategic assistance,  amounted to less than $6.0 billion.
- II -
In spite of the constraints of doctrine and resources under which the U.S.  assistance
policy has labored, there are a number of important lessons from past experience.3  Let me
turn first to  some  of the  lessons  from assistance  for sector development  and  then to the
lessons from macroeconomic  assistance policy.Sector Policy
Assistance to physical infrastructure  development.  During the  1950s and 1960s, large
scale  investment in transport facilities  (roads, railroads, ports, airports)  and multipurpose
resource development projects (power, flood control, irrigation) occupied a very prominent
place  in both bilateral  and multilateral  development  assistance portfolios.  Many of these
projects  made substantial contributions to the development  of recipient countries.  Others
became  a burden.  During the  1970s,  infrastructure  projects  were  severely  criticized  on
technical  grounds.  Cost  overruns  were  often  substantial;  the  technology  was  often
incompatible  with  the  level  of  country  development;  failure  to  consider  exchange  rate
distortions  often  led  to  inappropriate  investments.  During  the  1970s,  infrastructure
investments became the subject of intense scrutiny and severe criticism by the environmental
community.  Some of this  criticism was valid.  Much of it was  overblown.  It is, however,
again possible to take a much more positive view of lending for infrastructure development.
The technical,  environmental,  and economic aspects  of project evaluation and design have
become  more sophisticated.  And the services  provided by infrastructure  are essential  for
economic growth.
Agricultural  and rural  development.  Sustained  growth  in agricultural  production
requires a close articulation of public and private sector support for research, development
and  technology  transfer.  The private sector has  generally been relatively  efficient  in the
development and transfer of mechanical and chemical technology and in the distribution of
technical inputs.  The public sector has been more effective in the development of biological
and information technology.  Public sector agricultural research and extension has achieved5
rates  of  return  that  are  among  the  highest  available  to  either  national  governments  or
development  assistance  agencies.  The  underinvestment  in agricultural  research reflects  a
continuing  failure  on  the  part  of  both  donor  agencies  and  national  governments  to
understand  the  role  of agricultural  development  in  generating  economic  growth  and  in
contributing  to more equitable  income  distribution.
Efforts by bilateral and multilateral donors to assist in the development of integrated
community and rural development progress have met with much less success than attempts
to enhance  agricultural  production.  One of the  major sources  of disillusionment has been
the lack of consistency between the  dynamics of rural development  and the imperatives  of
donor  assistance.  Successful rural  development  programs  tend to be small  in geographic
scope, and slow to implement; impose intensive demands on professional and administration
capacity;  difficult to assess within the framework of conventional  cost benefit analysis; and
difficult to monitor.  A second source of disillusionment has been the difficulty of achieving
congruence  between  the  local-self  help  and  resource  mobilization  philosophy  of  rural
development programs  and the objectives of donors to achieve  measurable improvements
on basic human needs indicators within the space  of the project  cycle.
Assistance  for investment  in human resource  development.  Both the development
theorists  and assistance  agencies were slow to recognize that investment  in education and
other  forms of human capital  represented  a high pay-off source  of economic  growth.  As
evidence  began  to  accumulate,  indicating  high  rates  of return  to education,  perspectives
began to change.  Assistance in health and family planning also came to be recognized  as
an  investment  in human  capital.  The initial  transfer  of health  technology  from  western6
society to developing countries has often been inappropriate.  We have transferred sickness
recovery  systems  rather than health  systems.  There  is an  enormous  challenge  facing the
development assistance community, as well as national health systems, to design systems that
enable families to live healthy lives so that they do not have to enter the sickness recovery
system.  There is  also an enormous need for the establishment  of health research capacity
in the tropics.  A combination  of malaria  and  tuberculoses  resurgence,  the  high  cost  of
dealing with infectious disease, the failure to make progress in dealing with parasitic disease,
the emerging AID's epidemic and the health effects of environmental  change suggest  that
over the next two  decades  the health  dimension  of human resource  development  should
command a level of attention similar to that received by agriculture in the 1960s and 1970s.
Macroeconomic  Policy
The influence of domestic economic policy on the effectiveness  of donor economic
assistance.  The effectiveness  of economic assistance has been strongly conditioned by both
the  more  economic  and  sectoral  economic  policies  of the  host  country.  The  contrast
between  (a)  the  effectiveness  of assistance  to Korea  before  and after  1961  and (b)  the
effectiveness of assistance to Ghana and Ivory Coast during the 1960's and 1970's are among
the more dramatic examples.  In the early  1960s Korea was  still regarded as an economic
"basket case".  The  Syngman  Rhee  government  managed  economic  policy  to  maximize
foreign economic assistance rather than enhancing economic growth.  It was only after more
growth oriented policies were  adopted  in the mid-1960s that the physical and institutional
infrastructure investments funded by U.S. economy assistance in the 1950s began to pay off.7
At independence  in  1957  Ghana had  a well  established  export  sector,  a reasonably  well
developed physical infrastructure, a relatively high level of literacy and the highest per capita
income  in Africa.  The Ivory  Coast  lagged behind  Ghana in practically  every indicator  of
development.  By the mid-1980s  the economic situation in the two countries was essentially
reversed.  Ghana has pursued policies of import substitution  and  direct state intervention
in  almost  every  area  of  economic  activity.  In  the  Ivory  Coast  government  policy  was
directed  toward guiding rather  than controlling the private sector.
Policy dialogue  and policy based lending.  The effectiveness  of economic  assistance
is  influenced  (a)  by the  degree  of convergence  in  the  views  of the donor  and  recipient
countries  concerning the  laters  economic  policies and  (b) by the  importance  of economic
development  objectives  relative  to  other  donor  motivations  in  decisions  concerning  the
volume and allocation of economic assistance.4  The dominance of donor strategic interests
relative to commitment to economic policy reform has been demonstrated repeatedly in the
case  of  Turkey.  The  willingness  of the  U.S.  to  support  Turkish  policy  in  trading  off
economic  reform against  short  term strategic  concerns  contributed to  the  severity of the
series  of growth  cycles  experienced  by the Turkish economy (1950-1958;  1959-1969;  1970-
1979).  For an even  more extreme  example  one  can turn to the history of U.S.  economic
assistance  to Egypt.
The  influence  of the  size  of assistance  flows  on national  economic  growth.  The
impact  of the  size  of development  assistance  flows  on  the rate  of economic  growth  of
recipient countries represents a continuing theoretical and empirical puzzle.  The evidence
to  support  a  conclusion  that  differences  in  the  level  of  development  assistance  have8
accounted  for  major  intercountry  growth  differences  is  not  available.  There  is  some
evidence  that rates  of return  to  economic  assistance  by the  OECD  countries  has  been
relatively  high.5  There is evidence,  though somewhat  inconclusive,  that in the absence  of
effective macroeconomic  policy there is a negative relationship between the size of foreign
aid transfers  and the  rate of economic  growth.  But the evidence  to support a  conclusion
that differences in the level of development assistance has accounted for major differences
in inter-country  growth rates is not available.
What is the bottom line?  What should we have learned from the past?  At the risk
of only slight overstatement,  let me make two  assertions.
The removal of distortions in monetary, fiscal, trade, commodity, and consumer policy
does not produce development!  Policy reform is, in some countries, a necessary condition
for  development.  It can reduce  the  "X inefficiency"--the  gap between the  level  of output
that has already been achieved and the level  of output that is potentially feasible.  But the
real  sources  of economic  growth  are  investments  in human  and  physical  capital  and  in
productivity  enhancing  technical  and  institutional  change.  These  more  fundamental
investments must draw on resources -- financial, political, intellectual -- that are not readily
mobilized  in  the  short  run.  They  do  not  generate  immediate  increments  in  economic
growth.  They  often  require  a  generation  or  more  to  mature.  The  failure  to  make
investments  needed  to expand  technical  and institutional capacity in the  1970s is  a major
reason  why  the  response  to  the  policy  reforms  of  the  1980s  have  often  been  so
disappointing.9
One way of summing up is to insist that advising "shock treatment" for countries with
weak or missing market institutions or limited technical capacity - that they go "cold turkey"
on policy reform - must be rejected  as  little more than self indulgent intellectual  sloth.  It
reflects a lack of willingness to invest the intellectual energy necessary to understanding the
economies  and the societies  for which reform  prescriptions  are being written.
- III-
Now let me  turn to the future  of U.S.  development  assistance.  I will lay  out two
scenarios.  The first will be what I would like  to see  happen.  The second  will be what  I
expect  to  happen.  Both  scenarios  will  be  conditioned  by  a  search  for  a post  cold  war
rationale for U.S.  development assistance.  Is there anything  that can, or will, replace the
cold war  as a rationale for the mobilization  of U.S. resources  to assist in the development
of poor countries?  Both  scenarios  attempt  to take into  consideration  the changes  in the
global  economy over the last several decades and the changing role of the United States in
the world economy and polity.
The evolution of the  global economic system has dramatically  altered the demands
and opportunities for effective foreign economic  assistance.  Until the late  1960s  the world
operated under a fixed exchange rate regime.  The transfer of resources from dollar surplus
countries  to  deficit  countries  could  be  viewed  as  part  of  the  cost  of maintaining  the
institutional infrastructure  of an increasingly liberal international economic order - at least
until the "dollar surplus" was replaced by a "dollar glut".  We now have lived with a flexible
exchange rate system for more than two decades.  An international capital market has been
put in place  that makes  it possible  for  countries  that pursue  reasonably  sound  domestic10
monetary and fiscal policies to borrow the financial resources they need.  The rationale for
concessional resource transfers, other than to the poorest countries, has largely disappeared.
Indeed,  large  concessional  transfers  can,  unless  carefully  managed,  result  in  perverse
distortions in the recipient countries  exchange  rate.
The  position of the United  States  in the world  economy  has  also  changed.  The
United States is no longer as confident of its technical  leadership as it was when President
Truman  announced  the "Point Four Program."  It  is no longer as confident of its capacity
to  assist  in the  design  of education  and  health  systems  as  it was  when  economists  first
started conceptualizing the role of human capital in economic development.  It is no longer
as confident of its capacity to contribute to the solution of either domestic or global poverty
as it was when President Johnson outlined his "New Society" programs.  And our confidence
in our ability to prescribe  monetary and fiscal policy for others ought  to be much weaker
than it was a decade  ago when the U.S. was the world's largest creditor nation rather than
the largest debtor nation.  This means that we need to reform our bilateral programs in an
economic  cooperation rather than assistance mode.
--IV-
These  changes  in  the  international  and  in  the  domestic  economy  imply  a much
different mission for the U.S.  assistance  agency than in the past.  We need  to reform our
bilateral program to operate in an economic cooperation rather than an economic assistance
mode.  United States assistance  efforts should focus very largely on the high pay-off areas
of human capital development and of technical and institutional change.  My own model for
the future would be an Economic  Cooperation Agency  (ECA) with much of its economic11
development  and  humanitarian  assistance  activity  organized  in  two  semi-autonomous
institutes  under the ECA umbrella.
An  Institute  for  Scientific.  Technical  and  Economic  Cooperation.6  The  ISTEC
mandate should be to enhance the two way exchange  of knowledge and technology among
all nations rather than simply technical  assistance to poor countries.  In today's world the
United States has as much to learn as to give from strengthening  technical and intellectual
interchange.  The  ISTC  mandate  should  be  global.  It  should  include  the  OECE,  the
formerly centrally planned economies  and the less  developed countries.  Emphasis should
be  strongest  in areas  such  as  agriculture,  health,  population  and  environment.  Program
operations should be largely subcontracted to the sectoral departments such as Agriculture,
Health  Education  and  Welfare,  Environmental  Protection  and  the  National  Institute  of
Standards  and Technology  - in which the scientific and technical capacity to implement the
ISTEC program resides.  The funding necessary to maintain capacity for the nations major
research  universities  should be placed  on  a long-term  institutional  grant basis  somewhat
similar to that provided by the Hatch Act for domestic  agricultural  research.
An Institute  for Private  Voluntary  Cooperation  (IPVC).7  Humanitarian  concerns
for the poor in the poorest countries and for those displaced  by international  conflict  and
domestic repression will  continue to represent  a basic  impulse for foreign  assistance by a
wide  spectrum  of the American public.  Official  assistance  agencies  do not have  a strong
record  of performance  in this area.  The IPVC  should be organized  to fund programs by
PVO's,  cooperatives,  and  other agencies  on  a  competitive  bases.  Too  much  of present
funding  has  been  treated  as  an  entitlement.  A  major  emphasis  should  be  placed  on12
strengthening  indigenous  PVO's.  Much  of food  aid,  except  that  allocated  for so  called
"market development",  should be channeled  through the IPVC.  I hope,  but am skeptical,
that the PVO's will be able to become more effective in using food aid as an instrument  of
development  than in the past.
The Public Foundations
In  addition  to  the  ISTEC  and  IPVC,  serious  attention  should  be  given  to
strengthening  the  publicly  supported development  foundations.  These  include  The  Asia
Foundation, the Inter-American  Development Foundation,  and the African  Development
Foundation.  The historical roots of the Asia Foundation were deeply embodied in cold war
doctrine.  During the last decade, however, it has emerged with substantial capacity to work
on issues of democratization  and privatization - items high on the foreign policy and foreign
assistance  agenda  of the  Bush administration.  The  Inter-American  Foundation  and the
African Development Foundations  are products of the "New Directions" and "Basic Needs"
foreign assistance thrust of the  1970s.  They have now emerged with substantial capacity to
work  directly with the poor and with the informal  sectors  in poor countries.  A cautious
expansion in support for the programs  of these public foundations would seem warranted.
My caution stems from concern that too rapid growth in support could outrun their capacity.
Security Assistance
I have not discussed in this section the significant component of the foreign economic
assistance  budget  allocated  as  (strategic)  supporting assistance.  This  component  of the13
foreign aid budget has declined more rapidly that economic assistance  since the mid-1980s.
It is particularly difficult to assess the future of the supporting assistance  component  of the
foreign assistance  budget  at this  time.  Regardless  of the resolution  of the Gulf War, it  is
reasonable  to  anticipate  a rather  complete  review and  reevaluation  of U.S.  security  and
economic  interests in  the entire region between Guam  and Gibraltar.  It would not be at
all surprising if the United States, frustrated by its attempts to achieve political stabilization
in East Asia, would conclude that its economic and strategic interests in the region are much
less significant than in the past.  One effect of such an evaluation  is likely to be a decline
in the flow of assistance resources to countries in which our assistance  has the character of
"rent" for  military  base  rights  and  to  the  largest  assistance  recipients  in  the  region,
particularly Egypt and Israel.
Multilateral Assistance
A fourth area that needs to be discussed is the future of U.S. support for multilateral
institutions.  The relationship between the United States and several of the United Nations
specialized agencies remains troubled.  The ascendancy of the State Department Bureau for
International Organizations, relative to the sectoral departments, in the formulation of U.S.
policy  toward the UN specialized  agencies  combined  with  personal  antagonisms  between
Bureau administrators and specialized  agency director generals and growing arrears in U.S.
budget  contributions  have  resulted  in  a weakening  of the  U.S.  role  in  several  of  the
specialized  agencies.  In spite of this troubled history it would  not be surprising to see the
emergence  of stronger U.S. support for the work of specialized  agencies in the 1990s.  The14
role  of the United  Nations  during  the Persian-Gulf  crisis has  generated  a more positive
official and popular attitude in the U.S. toward the U.N.  The easing of U.S.-USSR tensions
will  remove  some  of  the  ideological  tensions  that  frequently  spilled  over  into  U.S.
relationships with the specialized  agencies.  Multilateral  assistance will be seen by the U.S.
government  as a cheaper,  and  less frustrating,  approach  to assisting the  economical  and
politically least developed Third World  countries  than bilateral assistance.
-V-
Now let me turn to what I expect to happen.  I do not see anything on the horizon
that  will  be  as  effective  as  the  cold  war  has been in generating  the  political  resources
necessary  to prevent  a continuation  of the  decline  of assistance  resources  that has been
going on since the mid-1980s.
The  capacity  of the U.S.  to sustain  its international  commitments  is  continuing  to
erode.  The  growth  of the  U.S.  economy,  measured  in terms  of either  aggregate  or per
capita productivity, has been slow.  The decline in the relative strength of the U.S. economy
has weakened our capacity to play a hegemonic role in global economic and political affairs.
I have  (reluctantly)  found  myself in agreement with Jean Kirkpatrick,  who  insisted,  in a
recent article in Foreign Affairs, that the U.S. must reconcile itself to being "just a power".8
But  the declining  capacity  of the U.S.  economy  to sustain a first  class global  posture  in
economic  and  security  affairs  cannot  fully account  for  the constraints  under  which  U.S.
foreign assistance will be forced  to operate in the  1990s.  The effects of the irresponsible
fiscal policies pursued since the early 1980s will not be readily resolved.  The annual interest
burden on the national  debt is now approximating  the  annual cost of the military budget.15
This means that, at least for the next decade,  the U.S. government will be forced  to tailor
both its foreign and domestic policies to a very constipated  fiscal  environment.
Are there any forces at work which might reverse the anticipated decline in assistance
resources?  One could be the emergence of one or more common threats to the well being
of  both  developed  and  developing  countries.  There  has  been  a  good  deal  of rhetoric
recently about environmental  security.  There  is little doubt that the transnational  nature
of a number of environmental  threats  - global climate  change,  acid rain, and  others - will
require  the strengthening  of transnational  or international  institutions.  There  is  also the
possibility  of a global health crisis  emerging as we  move into the first decades  of the next
century.  A global health crisis could result in an international  resource  mobilization effort
to resolve the  crisis.  It is doubtful  that the number of refugees moving across borders will
decline.  But  I do  not  visualize  any  of  these  common  concerns  generating  the  political
resources  that will be needed  to prevent the erosion of U.S. assistance  resources.
I find myself particularly concerned  about the process of assistance policy formation
and  resource  allocation  as  we  move  into  the  post  cold  war  era.  Each  assistance
constituency, within the government  and outside,  is attempting to carve  out for its favored
program  area  (population,  environment,  food  and  others ) a larger  share  of a declining
assistance budget (Table 1).  The lack of a central policy focus leaves the assistance budget
particularly vulnerable  to such efforts.
The  continuing  fatigue  and  disorientation  in the  U.S. bilateral  effort  will  not  be
resolved by the typical Washington remedy - by reorganizing AID.  Moving organizational
boxes  around (as  in the  1979  reorganization  that created  IDCA);  attempts to rationalize16
interagency  conflict and cooperation  (as in the  1990 food aid reforms);  or attempts to grant
parts of the aid program greater  autonomy from political pressures  (as in the  case  of the
public  foundations  such  as  The  Asia  Foundation  or  the  Inter-American  Development
Foundation,  or my suggestions  in this paper) will not resolve  this problem.
The problem of lack of focus will not be resolved  until a  new post cold war vision
of the kind of world that we want to live in during the first half of the 21st century captures
the political and popular imagination.Table  1
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